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Introduction
Since the ratification of the Constitution, we have opened our courts to
disputes between foreign plaintiffs and domestic defendants. 2 Since the
New Deal, we have actively regulated the conduct of U.S. businesses, both
at home and abroad, to ensure a baseline degree of accountability. 3 In
spite of these two long-standing traditions, a significant, albeit narrow, gap
has persisted in our legal regime. Until recently, foreign nationals have
been effectively denied the opportunity to extend accomplice liability to
U.S. businesses whose foreign affiliates commit human rights violations on
foreign soil. There have been at least two barriers to such suits. First, as a
matter of procedure, the doctrine of forum non conveniens enables a court,
at its discretion, to decline jurisdiction when it determines that the conven-
ience of the parties and ends of justice would be better served if the action
were brought and tried in another forum. 4 Second, as a matter of sub-
stance, municipal tort law generally fails to reach such defendants under a
theory of concerted action. 5
In March 1997, U.S. District Judge Richard Paez issued a preliminary
jurisdictional ruling in the case of Doe v. Unocal6 which, if upheld on
appeal, should mitigate this lapse in accountability. The Unocal litigation 7
involves claims brought by Burmese citizens against Unocal Corp., a Cali-
fornia-based energy company, for human rights violations committed in
Burma by Unocal's foreign business associate. These asserted violations
furthered Unocal's pecuniary interests. Believing there is no functioning
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend... to Controver-
sies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.").
3. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE 21-24 (1990).
4. See Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing tort
claims by Costa Rican agricultural workers harmed in Costa Rica by exposure to defend-
ant's pesticides on grounds of forum non conveniens); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (discussing tort claims by Peruvian citizens
harmed by toxic emissions stemming from defendant's smelting operations in Peru on
grounds of forum non conveniens); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (discussing tort claims by Ecuadoran plaintiffs against U.S. corporation for the
alleged contamination of the air, ground, and water in Ecuador on grounds of forum non
conveniens).
5. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 46, at
322-24 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875, 876, 877 (1977). See
also Developers Must Pick Local Partners Carefully, PowER GENERATION TECHNOLOGY &
MARKETS, Aug. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ("Hire local part-
ners to smooth the way when developing a power project abroad is the usual sage advice
offered at U.S. power development seminars.").
6. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
7. A related action was also filed by the National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma, and four Burmese refugees.
See National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, No. 96 Civ. 6112
RAP (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 3, 1996). On November 5, 1997, the district court issued a
ruling granting in part and dismissing in part Unocal's motion to dismiss. See National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, No. 96 Civ. 6112, 176 F.R.D.
329 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1996). Judge Paez' ruling parallels its analysis and holding in Doe
v. Unocal.
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judiciary in their home country (and fearing the wrath of the military
regime currently in power there), the Unocal plaintiffs have turned to the
U.S. courts for redress." To avoid the substantive and procedural obstacles
mentioned above, they have bypassed traditional municipal causes of
actions and have rested their claims on the controversial Alien Tort Claims
Act9 (ATCA), a statute that renders a narrow class of conduct actionable in
U.S. courts. 10
This innovative use of the ATCA to fill the aforementioned gap in U.S.
human rights jurisprudence was attempted only once before and proved
unsuccessful." Nonetheless, in a landmark ruling, Judge Paez held that
the Unocal plaintiffs had in fact stated a colorable ATCA claim against the
U.S. corporation for the extra-territorial conduct of its foreign affiliate.'
2
The Unocal holding is certainly appealing as a matter of fundamental
fairness: U.S. corporations should not be allowed to intentionally or reck-
lessly ravage third world populations in pursuit of the almighty dollar.
Also appealing is its proscription of a limited range of conduct. Unocal
does not speak to poor working conditions or low wages; it addresses only
the most egregious forms of conduct.
Despite such favorable attributes, the "Unocal doctrine" 13 has weak-
nesses and limitations - most of which can be attributed to its shaky
grounding in customary international law. This note will argue that the
doctrine could be both bolstered and authenticated through legislation
codifying what currently exists as judge-made law. Part I surveys the Uno-
cal litigation and, by charting the evolution of the ATCA, places Judge
Paez's groundbreaking ruling in context. Part II analyzes the current
causes of action available to foreign plaintiffs seeking redress for vicarious
extra-territorial torts - municipal tort claims and ATCA proceedings -
and underscores their inadequacy. Part III argues that new federal legisla-
tion rooted in the Commerce Clause would be the optimal cure for the
plight of the Unocal plaintiff. It advances a prototype of the legislation con-
templated as well as policy arguments that support it.
8. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
10. See id.
11. See Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988). In Carmi-
chael, a British national was imprisoned and tortured by Saudi Arabian authorities
because of his outstanding debts to various creditors (including five U.S. businesses).
He brought suit against the U.S. creditors under the ATCA alleging that they were vicari-
ously responsible for his maltreatment. The Fifth Circuit denied his claim holding that
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action as there was no evidence that the
U.S. defendants "in any way conspired with or aided and abetted" the Saudi officials. Id.
at 115.
12. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 896.
13. A term coined by Gregory Wallace in Fallout From Slave-Labor Case is Troubling,
150 NJ. LJ. 896, Dec. 8, 1997, at 24, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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I. Background
A. Precarious Project Finance: The Unocal Litigation
In 1991, an international consortium of oil companies entered into negoti-
ations with the military government of Burma - the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) 14 - and the country's state-owned oil com-
pany - the Myanmar Ministry for Oil and Gas Enterprises (MOGE) -
regarding oil and gas exploration in the Yadana gas field.' 5 The negotia-
tions blossomed into an ambitious joint venture, a gas drilling project
requiring the construction of a gas pipeline to run from the off-shore drill-
ing site, through the Tenasserim region of Burma, into Thailand. As part of
the agreement, the SLORC was required to clear the land along the pipe-
line's path and provide the labor, materials, and "security" necessary for its
construction. 16 In early 1993, Unocal Corp., a California-based energy
company, formally agreed to participate in the venture. The corporation
received a founders' stake in the project, investing approximately $340 mil-
lion in the $1.2 billion enterprise. 17
The cerebration behind the joint construction project is regarded as
flawless - the perfect meld of First World capital and Third World mar-
kets.' 8 Its execution, however, is perceived as heartless. In 1996, farmers
from the Tennasserim region, represented by a coalition of attorneys,
including the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, brought a class
action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
against Unocal and its senior executives, Total S.A., 19 the SLORC, and the
MOGE.20 Their complaint alleged that Unocal's Burmese government
partners "used and continue to use violence and intimidation to relocate
whole villages, enslave farmers living in the area . . .and steal farmers'
property for the benefit of the pipeline."2 1 While the complaint did not
assert that Unocal directly participated in any of these actions, it main-
tained that Unocal and Total "subsidized" their local partners' actions and
"were aware of, and benefitted from, and continue to be aware of and bene-
fit from, the use of forced labor to support ... the gas pipeline project."' 22
14. The SLORC assumed power in 1988. It is known for its repression of a vigorous
pro-democracy movement as well as its mistreatment of minority tribes. The SLORC has
been widely reviled internationally; even its attempt to change Burma's name to
Myanmar has been rejected by the U.S. State Department, by human rights groups, and
by the democratically elected government-in-exile. See Steve Barth, U.S. Stands Alone on
Burma Sanctions, WORLD TRADE, July 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 7470910.
15. SeeJoseph D. Pizzurro & Nancy E. Delaney, New Peril for Companies Doing Busi-
ness Overseas; Alien Tort Claims Act Interpreted Broadly, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 24, 1997, at S5.
16. See id.
17. See Dev George, Unocal or Unoburm, OFFSHORE, July, 1997, at 8, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
18. See Tristram Korten, Unocal on Trial for Burma Crimes: L.A. Case Could Change
the Rules of World Trade, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct. 24, 1997, at 15.
19. Total S.A. is a French oil company implicated in the Yadana project.
20. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-84.
21. Frank G. Long, Social Policy: Abuses Can Cost You, Aiuz. Bus. GAzETr, Sept. 11,
1997, at 14.
22. id.
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As a result, Unocal and its partners "caused the local residents to suffer
death of family members, assault, rape and other torture, forced labor and
the loss of their homes and property ..... 23
The complaint invoked federal jurisdiction via the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA)24 and asserted two federal causes of action: (1) a violation of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); and (2) a
"substantive" violation of ATCA triggered by conduct proscribed by cus-
tomary international law,25 i.e., "forced labor," "torture," "violence against
women," and "arbitrary arrest and detention."26 In calling for injunctive,
declaratory, and compensatory relief, the complaint rationalized its resort
to the U.S. judicial system as follows: "[t]here is no functioning judiciary
in Burma and any suit against defendants would have been and would still
be futile and would result in serious reprisals."27
Unocal's first defensive tactic at the pleading stage was a motion for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 19.28 Its argument was straightforward: co-
defendants SLORC and MOGE were immune from jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA);29 as the two were necessary par-
ties under Rule 19, the suit could not proceed without them. While Dis-
trict Judge Paez agreed with the former contention (that the SLORC and
MOGE were immune under the FSIA), he disagreed with the latter and held
that the co-defendants, alleged in the complaint to be joint tortfeasors, were
not necessary parties within the meaning of Rule 19.30
Unocal's second defensive maneuver at the pleading stage was a Rule
12(b)(1) motion that questioned the court's subject matter jurisdiction.31
Without considering the jurisdictional possibilities generated by diversity,
RICO, or the Torture Victim Protection Act,32 Judge Paez ruled that plain-
tiffs pleaded sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction based
on the Alien Tort Claims Act.3 3
23. Id.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
25. The first case to definitively hold that the ATCA provided a private cause of
action was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Hon.
John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U. LJ. 540 (1997). The Filartiga decision and
the controversy surrounding its interpretation of the Act will be addressed in turn.
26. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-84. The complaint also asserted various state law
claims pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction provision 28 U.S.C. § 1367. These
state claims include wrongful death, battery, false imprisonment, assault, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and negligent supervision. See id. at 884-
85.
27. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1601-11 (1976). Under the FSIA, foreign states and state-
related entities are immune from civil suits in U.S. federal (and state) courts unless such
suits fall within one of six enumerated exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
30. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 889.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
32. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
33. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 n.11.
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Unocal's third affirmative defense was a Rule 12(b)(6) 34 motion,
which argued that the plaintiffs' allegations of abuse by foreign government
officials in a foreign land did not state a claim against Unocal upon which
relief could be granted.35 Judge Paez held that the class's complaint did
not merely allege that Unocal was an unknowing business partner of the
SLORC and MOGE; 36 rather, it alleged that Unocal was either a co-conspir-
ator or joint tortfeasor fully aware of the atrocities being committed. As
such, the facts alleged in the complaint (accepted as true for purposes of
the 12(b)(6) motion) sufficiently stated a claim against Unocal.37
These preliminary rulings on the pleadings were released in an order
entered in March, 1997.38 Judge Paez's treatment of Unocal's first two
affirmative defenses was unremarkable. His interpretation and application
of the FSIA, in regards to the first, were consistent with existing U.S.
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit caselaw.39 Similarly, his interpretation
of the ATCA as providing a federal forum for violations of jus cogens
norms,40 in regards to the second, was also consistent with existing Ninth
Circuit caselaw.41 The truly novel aspect of the Unocal order (and the rea-
son the preliminary order has drawn the attention of corporate lawyers
across the country) is Judge Paez's treatment of the defendant's third
affirmative defense - the 12(b)(6) motion. Before the March order, no
court had held that a corporation (or any other private defendant) could be
liable under the ATCA by acting in concert with a foreign government in
violating universally recognized human rights standards.42 The following
overview places this ruling in its proper historical context.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
35. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 896.
36. Had it done so, Judge Paez maintained, the 12(b)(6) motion would have been
granted. Id. ("[U]nocal contends that plaintiffs' allegations establish the presence of a
business relationship with SLORC and MOGE and nothing more. Were this the case,
Unocal would clearly be entitled to a dismissal.").
37. See id. Two other affirmative defenses raised by Unocal but omitted from the
discussion above were (1) the running of the applicable statutes of limitation for the
plaintiffs' claims, and (2) the prudential concerns embodied in the act of state doctrine.
Judge Paez rejected the former on the ground that the defense raised a question of fact
and the latter on the grounds that the only defendant remaining in the suit was a domes-
tic entity and that the conduct alleged was so universally condemned. Id. at 892-97.
38. See id. at 880.
39. See Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 92 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, Canadian Consulate v. Holden, 519 U.S. 1091 (1997); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992); Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319,
323 (9th Cir. 1996); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 706 (9th
Cir. 1992).
40. A jus cogens norm "'is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.'" Siderman de Blake, 956 F.2d at 714 (citing Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties), May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679.
41. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1473 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Estate II"); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 498-500 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Estate I").
42. See Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 15, at 85.
Vol. 32
1998 Codification of the Unocal Doctrine
B. The Evolution of the ATCA. The Judiciary Act of 1789, the Filartiga
Line,. and the TVPA
1. The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute, currently embodied in § 1350,43 originated from a
clause in the first Judiciary Act of 1789. 4 4 The original clause, penned by
Oliver Ellsworth, read: "[The district courts] shall also have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."45
On three subsequent occasions, Congress modified the wording of the
clause.46 In its current form, the Alien Tort Statute reads: "[T]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."4 7
Notwithstanding the subtle, and perhaps meaningless,48 alterations in
its text, the Alien Tort Statute was largely ignored for nearly two centu-
ries.4 9 Plaintiffs rarely pleaded subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act,
and when they did, courts generally dismissed jurisdiction on the grounds
that the defendants' alleged conduct did not violate the law of nations.5 0
According to Professor Gary Born,5 1 the courts upheld Alien Tort jurisdic-
tion only twice prior to 1980 - once in 179552 and once in 1961. 5 3
Besides the courts' reluctance to find violations of the nebulous "law of
nations," the dormancy of the statute over this period can be explained by
the dearth of information available as to its intended purpose.5 4 Judge
Friendly, commenting on the statute's mysterious past, dubbed the statute
a "Legal Lohengrin" (after a shadowy character in a Wagner opera) and
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
45. Id.
46. See Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 445, 448-49 (1995). Congress first modified the clause
in rendering Section 563 (Sixteenth) in the Revised Statutes of 1873. Id. The second
modification by Congress occurred when Section 563 became Section 24 (Seventeenth)
of the Act of March 3, 1911. Id. Congress made its third and final modification when
the clause in Section 24 became Section 1350 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Id.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
48. See Sweeney, supra note 46, at 450 ("The changes in the text of the clause,
whether useful or pointless, did not affect the jurisdiction originally granted by the
clause to the federal courts.").
49. See GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL CmL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTs 36
(1996).
50. See id.
51. Professor Born is a prominent scholar in the field of international civil litigation.
52. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (ruling that the Alien
Tort Statute provides an alternative basis of jurisdiction over a suit to determine title to
slaves on board an enemy vessel taken on the high seas).
53. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (ruling that the Alien Tort
Statute serves as basis for jurisdiction over a child custody suit between aliens); See
BoRN, supra note 49, at 36.
54. See BoRN, supra note 49, at 36.
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remarked that "no one seems to know from whence it came."55
2. Filartiga and Its Progeny
In 1980, the Alien Tort Statute left the shadows when the Second Circuit
handed down Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,56 the first major appellate court inter-
pretation of the statute. In Filartiga, Paraguayan citizens Joel and Dolly
Filartiga alleged that Americo Norbeto Pena-Irala, a former Inspector Gen-
eral of Police in Paraguay, violated the law of nations by torturing and kill-
ing Joelito Filartiga (their son and brother respectively) while acting in his
official capacity. They asserted that their cause of action arose, inter alia,
under the ATCA. Never reaching the merits of the case, the district court
dismissed the claim and held that the statute was inapplicable to the facts
of the case.57 More specifically, the court held that under existing Second
Circuit caselaw, the "law of nations" (for purposes of § 1350) should be
construed narrowly so as to exclude the law that governs a state's treat-
ment of its own citizens.58
In a landmark decision, a panel of the Second Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that the Filartigas did in fact allege violations of jus cogens norms. 5 9
The court rested its conclusion on two premises.60 The first was that the
"law of nations" is a dynamic rather than static body of law.61 The second
was that the present state of customary international law, as defined by
"the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists," prohibits
official (state-sponsored) torture.62 As such, the court concluded that the
Filartigas did in fact allege conduct "in violation of the law of nations. '63
In allowing the suit to proceed, the court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that federal jurisdiction could not be exercised consistent with Arti-
cle III of the Constitution 64 and, more remarkably, reached the
unprecedented conclusion that the Alien Tort Statute confers not only fed-
eral jurisdiction but also a substantive cause of action.65 Although never
explicitly stating as much, the court indirectly advances this proposition
twice in the opinion.66
Besides being the first case to hold that the ATCA creates a substantive
cause of action,67 the Filartiga decision is significant in at least two more
respects. First, it is the earliest case to hold that plaintiffs could litigate
human rights abuses in federal court notwithstanding that the alleged acts
55. ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
56. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. See id. at 880.
58. See id.
59. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. See id. at 880-84.
61. See id. at 881 ("[It is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.").
62. Id. at 884.
63. Id. at 878.
64. See id. at 886.
65. See id. at 889.
66. See id.
67. See Walker, supra note 25, at 540.
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occurred abroad and that neither party was a U.S. citizen.68 Second, by
relying on a modern view of customary international law, the decision
opened the door for other courts to do the same.69
Since the Second Circuit boldly proclaimed that the ATCA provides
both a federal forum and a cause of action, two of the three Circuits to
reach the issue have concurred in the Filartiga formulation.70 The first to
do so was the Ninth Circuit in 1994;71 the Eleventh Circuit followed in
1996.72
The D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to date that has declined to follow
Filartiga's reading of the ATCA as providing a substantive cause of action.
73
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,74 a panel consisting of Circuit Judges
Edwards, Bork, and Robb dismissed the claims brought by survivors of
those murdered by the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") during
an attack on a civilian bus in Israel in 1978. While the short per curiam
opinion reveals only the facts of the case and a seven-word summation of
the holding,75 each judge wrote a separate and lengthy concurrence setting
forth his own view as to the proper legal basis for dismissal.
Judge Edwards' concurrence endorsed Filartiga's holding that the
ATCA provides a cause of action as well as a federal forum.76 He also
accepted the Second Circuit's position that international law forbids a state
from torturing its citizens and that individuals have a right to be free from
such torture.77 He pushed for dismissal, however, because of his belief
that "the law of nations [does not impose] the same responsibility or liabil-
ity on non-state actors.., as it does on states and persons acting under.
color of state law."78 Thus, the PLO could not violate the law of nations
because it was not a recognized nation within its own territory.
Judge Bork's concurrence was sharply at odds with both the Filartiga
formulation and Judge Edwards' concurrence. In Bork's view, the ATCA
does not provide a cause of action but only a federal forum.79 The cause of
action, if any, would have to come from another source. As a corollary to
this argument, Judge Bork maintained that individual plaintiffs cannot turn
to customary international law to provide a right of action because it can-
68. See id. at 546-47.
69. See id. at 547.
70. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11"h Cir. 1996); Estate II, 25 F.3d at
1475-76; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
71. See Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475 ("We thus join the Second Circuit in concluding
that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, creates a cause of action for violations of
specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards....").
72. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 848 ("[The ATCA] establishes a federal
forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to viola-
tions of customary international law.").
73. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 775 ("We affirm the dismissal of this action.").
76. See id. at 777-82.
77. See id. at 777.
78. Id. at 776.
79. See id. at 801.
Cornell International Law Journal
not fairly be treated as self-executing8 ° or as part of the federal common
law.8 1
In the third Tel-Oren concurrence, Judge Robb argued that dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claims was proper for prudential reason because the claims
implicated nonjusticable political questions.8 2 In his view, "[i]nternational
terrorism consists of a web that the courts are not positioned to
unweave."8 3 He warned that in attempting to do so, courts will become
entangled in foreign policy, and in doing so, jeopardize the flexibility of the
Executive Branch to deal with international issues diplomatically.8 4
3. Congress and the TVPA
While the Supreme Court has heretofore refrained from contributing to, or
altogether resolving, the ATCA controversy, Congress has not been so pas-
sive. In 1993, it passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),85 which
creates federal causes of action as follows:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority or color of law, of any
foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for dam-
ages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person
who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.8 6
According to at least one scholar, the enactment of the TVPA lends
itself to "contrary inferences as to the view Congress takes of the Alien Tort
Statute."8 7 On one hand, the passage of the TVPA could mean, consistent
with Judge Bork's view, that Congress intends for only those torts it
expressly enumerates to be actionable in U.S. courts.88 Conversely, the
House Report accompanying the Act, after explicitly referring to the fact
that "[a]t least one Federal judge ... questioned whether section 1350 can
be used by victims of torture committed in foreign nations absent an
explicit grant of a cause of action,"8 9 continues:
Official torture and summary execution merit special attention in a statute
expressly addressed to those practices. At the same time, claims based on
80. See id. at 809-10.
81. See id. at 811. Quoting Judge Bork:
To say that international law is part of federal common law is to say only that it
is nonstatutory and nonconstitutional law to be applied, in appropriate
instances, in municipal courts. It is not to say that, like the common law of
contract and tort ... by itself it affords individuals the right to ask for judicial
relief.
Id.
82. See id. at 825-26.
83. Id. at 823.
84. See id. at 824.
85. 28 U.S.C. § (2)(a) (1992).
86. Id.
87. Walker, supra note 25, at 551.
88. See id.
89. H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
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torture or summary execution do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately by covered by section 1350. That statute should remain intact
to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law.
90
4. Recent Caselaw Expanding the Bounds of ATCA Accountability
Once Filartiga and, arguably, the TVPA established that the law of nations
could generate civil liability for private acts of state-sponsored violence,
alien plaintiffs sought to expand the limits of this newly gained accounta-
bility. One direction in which they pushed was toward defendant liability
absent state action.9 1 The Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic
92
indicated that alien plaintiffs have made substantial headway along this
path.
Kadic, a consolidation of two suits, involved claims brought by Croa-
tian and Muslim citizens of Bosnia against Radovan Karadzic, president of
the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of "Srpska."93 The plaintiffs
contended that Karadzic, as commander of the Bosnian-Serb military
forces, engineered a pattern of atrocities against the Croat and Muslim
populations, including rape, forced prostitution, torture, and summary
execution.9 4 They alleged that these acts were part of a genocidal cam-
paign conducted during the course of the Bosnian Civil War.95 The dis-
trict court dismissed their complaint, holding that the action could not be
maintained under the Alien Tort Statute because the Bosnian-Serb military
faction, headed by Karadic, was not a state actor.
9 6
In reversing the district court's dismissal, the three-judge panel
explained that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, is not
confined in its reach to state action; in certain circumstances, private indi-
viduals as well as nations are capable of violating international law.
9 7
90. Id. See also Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The
TVPA codifies the holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala .... ).
91. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (involving a suit against a non-state
actor for human rights violations whose military regime was not a recognized state);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (involving a suit
against private U.S. corporations for human rights abuses and environmental torts com-
mitted abroad).
92. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
93. Id. at 236-37.
94. See id. at 237.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 237.
97. See id. at 239. According to the court, § 702 of the REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS sets forth a list of conduct that qualifies as such if precipitated by a
state actor; this list includes: "(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial dis-
crimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights." Id. at 240 (citing the RESTATEmENT (THIRD) O3 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986)). Similarly, § 404 of the Restatement sets forth
a partially overlapping list of offenses capable of being committed by non-state actors; this
list includes, "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
Cornell International Law Journal
More specifically, war crimes and genocide were proscribed under custom-
ary international law even where committed by non-state actors.98 In con-
trast, the "tort" of torture requires a finding of state implication to be
actionable under the ATCA.99
Another direction in which post-Filartiga plaintiffs have pushed the
bounds of the ATCA is toward extending liability beyond the direct perpe-
trators of the violence. 100 The first wave of this movement involved suits
against military commanders for the abuses committed by their troops.10 1
The second wave concerned the extension of liability to civilians close to
the military who conspired in the commission of human rights viola-
tions. 10 2 The third wave, of which Unocal is representative, now seeks to
extend liability to U.S. corporations for the human rights violations com-
mitted abroad by their subsidiaries or foreign business associates.103 In
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,10 4 Indonesian citizens unsuccessfully
brought suit under the ATCA against U.S. corporations for the alleged
human rights violations committed by Indonesian subsidiaries. 10 5 In the
pending Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.10 6 litigation, the family of a
man executed by the Nigerian government has sued the Shell Oil Com-
pany, charging it with complicity. 10 7 As addressed above, Doe v. Unocal'08
crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism." Id. at 240 (citing the RESTATEMENT
(TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1986)).
98. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-42.
99. See id. at 243.
100. See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort
Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 579, 597 (1997).
101. See id. See also Ford v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (finding ATCA cause of action stated against Argentine general for abuses com-
mitted by troops under his command), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding ATCA cause of
action stated against Haitia'n military leader for abuses committed by troops under his
command); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 198-99 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding
ATCA cause of action stated against Guatemalan Minister of Defense for abuses commit-
ted by military forces under his command).
102. See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 WL 164496, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 9, 1996) (finding ATCA cause of action stated against Rwandan
political leader for his role in the torture and murder of thousands of citizens); Belance v.
FRAPH, No. 94 Civ. 2619 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 1, 1994) (pending suit brought by a
woman allegedly tortured by members of a Haitian paramilitary group who established
an office in New York).
103. See Stephens, supra note 100, at 599. As discussed above, the first use of the
ATCA by a foreign national as a means of asserting a claim against a U.S. company for
"vicarious" human rights violations committed abroad is found in Carmichael v. United
Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5t h Cir. 1988).
104. 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997).
105. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that, inter alia, (1) the
plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the state action component necessary
for non-genocide related claims, and (2) the plaintiff failed to state a genocide claim
under the ATCA. Id. at 373-80.
106. Civ. No. 96-8386 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 1996).
107. See Gail Appleson, Royal Dutch/Shell Sued in Human Rights Case, REuTERs, Nov.
8, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
108. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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is meaningful as the first "successful" suit 0 9 in this wave of corporate
accountability litigation.' 10 If upheld on appeal, its jurisdictional holding
- that a U.S. corporation can be liable for the human rights violations
committed by a foreign government partner - will have a strong foothold
in ATCA caselaw.
II. Analysis: The Inadequacy of the Status Quo
This Note argues for the enactment of legislation to facilitate suits by aliens
who are the victims of extra-territorial human rights abuses abetted by U.S.
companies. Logically, the need for such legislation can only be established
by illustrating first how the causes of action currently available to such
foreign plaintiffs - municipal tort claims and now ATCA claims - are
insufficient vehicles for redress.
A. The Futility of Municipal Tort Claims
One viable cause of action in a U.S. court is a municipal tort action initi-
ated in any state in which the defendant company is subject to suit. In
bringing such a such a tort action, an alien plaintiff faces at least two for-
midable obstacles - one procedural and one substantive - and conse-
quently a low probability of success.,
A procedural impediment to the alien plaintiffs suit is the doctrine of
forum non conveniens which, considering the extra-territorial nature of the
litigation, the corporate defendant is sure to invoke. Forum non conveniens
is a precept of federal common law" 2 that has won substantial, but not
universal, following in state courts. 1 3 Section 1.05 of the Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act defines the doctrine as follows:
"When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action
109. As addressed above, the Doe plaintiffs were successful from a jurisdictional
perspective.
110. See Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 15.
111. Indeed, our legal regime's inefficacy in dealing with tort claims by aliens against
U.S. corporations is the topic of much scholarly debate. See, e.g., WARREN FREEDMAN,
FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODucTs LABILITY AcIONS: THE DEFENSE OF FORUM NON CON-
VENIENS (1988); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transna-
tional Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens & Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEx. L.
Rev. 937 (1990); Molly M. White, Comment, Home Field Advantage: The Exploitation of
Federal Forum Non Conviens by United States Corporations and its Effects on International
Environment Litigation, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 491 (1993); Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note,
One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the Interna-
tional Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 650 (1992); StephenJ. Darmody, Note, An Economic
Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Requested by Multinational Corporations -
The Bhopal Case, 22 GEo. WASH. J. Ir'L L. & EcON. 215 (1989).
112. Forum non conveniens has been promulgated in federal courts through its imple-
mentation in three U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: (1) Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981); (2) Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S.
518 (1947); and (3) Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
113. See BORN, supra note 49, at 298. A minority of states has either rejected the
forum non conveniens doctrine or remained uncommitted. States that have declined to
adopt the doctrine include Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Texas.
Id.
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should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action
in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just."1 14
Once forum non conveniens is invoked, the trial court must first deter-
mine the substantive law that governs the case under the relevant choice of
law rules.' 1 5 If the court concludes that a foreign law will govern the case,
it may consider this as a factor weighing in favor of dismissal.11 6 Next, the
court must determine whether an "adequate" alternative forum exists; the
doctrine presupposes at least two fora in which the defendant is amenable
to process." 7 A foreign forum is "adequate" when the parties will not be
deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly even though they may not enjoy
the same benefits they might receive in a U.S. court~1 8 If no acceptable
alternative exists, the case should not be dismissed regardless of the addi-
tional burden borne by the defendant.1 ' 9 If the trial court determines that
an acceptable forum does exist, the judge must then consider all the rele-
vant factors of public and private interest to determine whether justice
would be better served if the alternative jurisdiction adjudicated the
case. 120 Factors of private interest are those considerations that make the
trial of the case relatively easy, expeditious, and inexpensive for the par-
ties. 121 One significant factor is the deference given to the plaintiffs choice
of forum. 122 Other factors include: (1) the "relative ease of access to
sources of proof;" (2) the "availability of compulsory process" to secure the
attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining willing wit-
nesses; and (4) the potential need to observe first-hand the situs of the
controversy.' 23 Factors of public interest are those that pertain to the bur-
den placed on the adjudicating forum.124 They include: (1) the administra-
tive difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the localized interest in
having localized controversies decided at home; (3) the interest in con-
ducting the trial in a forum that is familiar with the law that must govern
the action; (4) avoiding conflict of laws problems, or in the application of
foreign law; and (5) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated
114. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, 13 U.L.A. § 1.05
(1986).
115. See McClelland Engineers, Inc., v. Munusamy 784 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (5 h Cir.
1986) ("Before deciding a motion to dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, a district court 'should first ascertain whether U.S. or foreign law governs
the suit."').
116. SeeJ. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.31 (1985).
117. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
118. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (51h Cir.
1987).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 84 cmt. c at 251 (1971)
("[Tjhe action will not be dismissed unless a suitable alternative forum is available to the
plaintiff.").
120. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 511-512.
121. See id. at 508.
122. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1365-66 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("[dis-
trict courts] ordinarily should respect an American plaintiffs forum choice.").
123. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
124. See id. at 508-09.
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forum with jury duty.125
From the foregoing, it should come as no surprise that claims of for-
eign "torts" by foreign plaintiffs are commonly defeated by forum non con-
veniens challenges.' 26 One can posit at least four explanations. First, in
regards to the choice-of-law determination, the default rule for personal
injury torts is lex loci delictus - a conclusion which supports deferral to
the alternative forum.' 27 Second, the "adequate alternative forum" stan-
dard does not appear to be especially demanding. In Torres v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp.,128 the district court held that the Peruvian courts were
not "inadequate" for forum non conveniens purposes despite plaintiffs' testi-
mony that those courts were "corrupt" and "in total disarray."129 Third,
the Supreme Court has stated that the deference usually afforded to the
plaintiffs choice of forum should cease where the plaintiff is not a U.S.
citizen.130 Fourth, most, if not all of the so-called public interest factors
work against a foreign plaintiff, especially where a personal injury tort is at
issue and lex loci governs.
A substantive impediment to the alien plaintiffs suit is the inherent
difficulty in establishing complicity or concerted action for purposes of
125. See id.
126. See Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11t Cir. 1985) (dismissing tort
claims by Costa Rican agricultural workers harmed in Costa Rica by exposure to defend-
ant's pesticides on grounds of forum non conveniens); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing tort claims by Peruvian citizens
harmed by toxic emissions stemming from defendant's smelting operations in Peru on
grounds of forum non conveniens); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (dismissing tort claims by Ecuadoran plaintiffs against U.S. corporation for the
alleged contamination of the air, ground, and water in Ecuador on grounds of forum non
conveniens).
127. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONLIcT OF LAws §§ 145, 146, 156 (1971).
§ 145. (1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties ....
(2) Contacts to be taken into account... to determine the law applicable to an
issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and busi-
ness of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
§ 146. In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relation-
ship ... in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
§ 156. (1) The law selected by an application of the rule of § 145 determines
whether the actor's conduct was tortious.
(2) The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury
occurred.
128. 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
129. Id. at 903.
130. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256 n.23 ("Citizens or residents deserve somewhat
more deference than foreign plaintiffs[.]").
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tort liability. Assuming the application of domestic tort law, 13 1 the
Restatement (Second) of Torts13 2 provides: "For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if
he... knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself[.J" On its face, § 876 appears to reach a U.S. corporation whose
foreign affiliate commits human rights violations in furtherance of a joint
initiative where the plaintiffs establish the requisite knowledge and substan-
tial assistance. However, a major limiting principle - and the probable
Achilles heel of the plaintiffs' case - is the extent to which the foreign
affiliate's actions are foreseeable. As stated in the comment to § 876(b):
"although a person who encourages another to commit a tortious act may
be responsible for other acts by the other, ordinarily he is not liable for
other acts that, although done in connection with the intended tortious act,
were not foreseeable by him."133 Understood in conjunction with tradi-
tional agency principles, as long as the U.S. company does not explicitly
order the affiliate to commit the violations, the corporation should be
shielded from liability to the extent that the affiliate's outrageous conduct
was outside the scope of the business relationship. 134 Illustration 11 in
the comment to § 876(b) elucidates this point:
A supplies B with wire cutters to enable B to enter the land of C to recapture
chattels belonging to B, who, as A knows, is not privileged to do this. In the
course of the trespass upon C's land, B intentionally sets fire to C's house. A
is not liable for the destruction of the house.135
Prosser and Keeton's view on concerted action corroborates the above:
There are ... occasional statements that mere knowledge by each party of
what the other is doing is sufficient "concert" to make each liable for acts of
the other; but this seems dearly wrong. Such knowledge may very well be
important evidence that a tacit understanding exists; but since there is ordi-
narily no duty to take affirmative steps to interfere, mere presence at the
commission of the wrong, or failure to object to it, is not enough to charge
one with responsibility. 13 6
B. The Limited Scope of Relief Afforded by the ATCA
The other viable cause of action - since Judge Paez released the Unocal
order - is an ATCA claim. While the ATCA alternative is certainly a step
in right direction (it expands the scope of corporate accountability), the
131. Applying the aforementioned forum non conveniens analysis to a case involving
an abetted extraterritorial tort, it is likely that a U.S. court would retain jurisdiction only
where that court first determined that municipal tort law was the rule of decision.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
133. Id. § 876(b) cmt. d.
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) ("A master is subject to liabil-
ity for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.").
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d, illus. 11 (1979).
136. KEarON Er AL., supra note 5, at 323-24.
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redress it affords is available to only a small class of plaintiffs in relatively
few courts.
To begin with, an alien plaintiff's choice of forum within the United
States is considerably restricted. In theory, her ATCA suit could be
brought in state court considering that: (1) state courts are fora of general
jurisdiction, and (2) the Alien Tort Statute does not grant the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. 137 Nonetheless, it is likely that a
state court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over the suit because of
the prudential concern that a state court is not the appropriate forum for
the resolution of issues implicating foreign affairs. 138 As a practical mat-
ter, the alien plaintiff would probably be required to assert her claim in a
federal court. Even still, not every federal court could be regarded as a
hospitable forum for her claim. Again, only three Circuits have officially
endorsed Filartiga's interpretation of the ATCA. Accordingly, any suit
brought in one of the other ten circuits risks a more restrictive reading of
the Alien Tort Statute in line with the interpretation advanced by Bork in
Tel-Oren.
Accepting, for the sake of argument, that the alien plaintiff is heard in
a federal forum that espouses Filartiga, she must still allege a "tort" that
constitutes a violation "of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 139 As few treaties generate private rights of action,140 she would
likely be required to turn to the nebulous "law of nations" to find a viola-
tion. Adopting Kadic as the prevailing view, she would not be afforded
relief unless the conduct complained of was inflicted by individuals acting
under the color of state authority; only the offenses set out in § 404 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations - piracy, participation in the slave trade,
attacks on aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and certain (heretofore identi-
fied) acts of terrorism - ostensibly would be actionable absent state
action. 141 Even if she could establish state implication, 142 her allegations
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See also Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 1996 WL
601431, 4 (E.D.La. 1996) ("[Tlhere is simply no indication that the Alien Tort Statute
makes federal courts the exclusive forum for all tort claims asserted by aliens.").
138. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (invalidating an Oregon probate
statute on the ground that it affects international relations and subsequently must give
way because it impairs the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy). Justice Stew-
art's concurrence in Zschernig illustrates the court's rationale: "We deal here with the
basic allocation of power between the States and the Nation .... [Tihe conduct of our
foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to
the probate courts of the several states." Id. at 443. See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 804-
05 n.II (Bork, J., concurring) ("A state court suit that involved a determination of inter-
national law would require consideration... [of] the principle that foreign relations are
constitutionally relegated to the federal government and not the states.").
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
140. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) ("Treaties of the United
States, though the law of the land, do not generally create rights that are privately
enforceable in courts.").
141. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1986)).
142. This is no easy task; courts have struggled to define the concept in a consistent
manner. Doe, 963 F. Supp at 890 (citing George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d
1227, 1230 (9' Cir. 1996)) ("Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have recog-
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would still have to conform to the limited class of offenses set out in § 702
of the Restatement and the TVPA. 14 3
III. Proposal: A Call for Federal Legislation
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that the present causes of action
available to foreign plaintiffs seeking redress for extraterritorial torts are
inadequate. Accepting that increased corporate accountability in this con-
text is in fact desirable - a proposition that will be established in turn -
the obvious question becomes, what is the most appropriate way to foster
such accountability? At least two approaches are conceivable, one "pas-
sive" and one "active." The passive approach entails a continued, some-
what optimistic reliance on the developing ATCA remedy. Given the
constant modernization of customary international law and the synchro-
nous expansion of ATCA accountability, it is only a matter of time before
the Alien Tort Statute affords comprehensive relief to alien plaintiffs seek-
ing redress against U.S. corporations for extraterritorial torts. The active
approach, in contrast, entails the enactment of new federal legislation to
facilitate such suits. For all the reasons discussed below, the active
approach is the sounder methodology.
A. The Remedial Law Should Come from New Federal Legislation, Not
Future ATCA Litigation
As discussed above, the ATCA, as currently interpreted, affords a limited
scope of relief for alien plaintiffs vicariously victimized by U.S. corpora-
tions. It is certainly plausible, given the evolutionary character of ATCA
jurisprudence, that the statute will eventually provide a more sweeping
form of redress. Nonetheless, there are at least three reasons why contin-
ued reliance on the Alien Tort Statute is an inferior alternative to the enact-
ment of new federal legislation. First, there is simply no guarantee that
courts will continue to stretch the ATCA to provide a wider scope of relief.
Second, enacting new legislation would certainly take less time than wait-
ing for favorable developments in ATCA jurisprudence. Third, the ATCA's
very grounding in customary international law renders it an inappropriate
remedial device. More specifically, it is ideologically unsound to route
what in effect are municipal tort claims through customary international
law simply because our own legal system is unable (or perhaps, unwilling)
to address them.
When an alien brings suit for a foreign tort committed exclusively by a
foreign defendant [e.g., when a Burmese plaintiff sues a Burmese defendant
in a U.S. court for torture carried out in Burma] we effectually channel the
claim through customary international law by affording the alien plaintiff
no viable cause of action other than an ATCA suit. Our deferral to custom-
nized that 'cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have
not been a model of consistency.'").
143. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL-
TIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986)).
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ary international law in such a scenario is logical because there would
exist no applicable U.S. law to apply to the case. Indeed, one can make a
strong argument that any domestic law proffered to govern the suit (other
than an attempt to codify international law principles in the tradition of
the TVPA) would be invalid as (1) beyond the scope of Congress' article I
authority,14 4 (2) "extraterritorial"'14 5 as a matter of legislative jurisdiction,
or (3) the inapplicable law to resort to under a modern, interest-based
choice of law determination.' 46 In contrast, when an alien plaintiff brings
suit for human rights violations committed abroad yet facilitated or abetted
by a U.S. corporation [e.g., when a class of Burmese nationals brings suit
against a California energy company in a California district court for extra-
territorial human rights violations], resort to customary international law
is not only circuitous, but in some sense "dishonest" because domestic law
- i.e., newly enacted federal legislation - could govern such suits without
triggering any of the three concerns discussed above.14 7
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Of Congress's enumerated powers set forth in Article
I, Section 8, only two deal with the regulation of extraterritorial affairs outside the realm
of national defense. Id. The Commerce Clause (Section 8, Clause 2) discusses only the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations" and would clearly fail as the justifi-
cation for U.S. law proscribing human rights violations among wholly foreign parties on
foreign soil. Id. Section 8, Clause 10, however, grants Congress the Power "[tlo define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations." Id. On its face, this provision could serve as the grounding for such
legislation, but would be valid only insofar as Congress' codification of "the Law of
Nations" was accurate.
145. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a long standing principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States,"'); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLIcT OF L WS
§ 32, at 32 ("It is difficult to conceive, upon what ground a claim can be rested, to give to
any municipal laws an extra-territorial effect, when those laws are prejudicial to the
rights of other nations, or to those of their subjects."). See also BoRN, supra note 49, at
511 ("Congress has the power to enact legislation that violates international law if that is
what it wishes to do. Nevertheless, U.S. Courts have long relied upon the related 'territo-
riality presumption': ... that federal legislation will not be interpreted as to apply extra-
territorially absent express language requiring this result.").
146. See RESTA MENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAws, supra note 127, §§ 145, 146,
156. There is a tangible difference between international limits on legislative jurisdic-
tion ("extraterritoriality" concerns) and national choice of law rules. BORN, supra note
49, at 623. Quoting Born:
There is a fundamental distinction between: (a) the limits that international law
imposes on a nation's exercise of legislative jurisdiction; and (b) the decision
that a nation makes whether to make use of its rights under international law to
assert legislative jurisdiction .... [I]nternational law will frequently permit two
(or more) states to assert legislative jurisdiction over the same conduct or trans-
action .... In these circumstances, national choice of law rules determine
whether a nation will apply its laws to conduct that it could properly regulate
under international law.
Id.
147. First, no one would doubt that domestic law regulating the extraterritorial con-
duct of U.S. businesses is within Congress's Constitutional authority under the Com-
merce Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 ("Congress Shall have the power ... [tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign nations."). Second, such domestic law could not fairly be
regarded as "extraterritorial" as it is well established that a nation may regulate the con-
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B. The Proposed Legislation
The new federal legislation contemplated by this Note borrows from both
the TVPA and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FRCP) - federal
legislation that, inter alia, prohibits "corrupt" payments to foreign govern-
ment and political officials. 14 8 In pertinent part, the proposed legislation
provides as follows:
SEC. 1. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.
(a) PROHIMMONS.-It shall be unlawful for any domestic business con-
cern 14 9 which makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce 150 to engage principally in an extra-territorial business
enterprise with or through a foreign affiliate where:
(1) that foreign affiliate was predisposed to commit one or more human
rights violations in furtherance of that enterprise when the agreement
with it was reached; and
(2) a human rights violation does in fact occur.
(b) PENALTEs.-Any domestic concern that violates subsection (a) of this
section shall:
(1) be fined not more than $4,000,000; and
(2) be liable to the injured party or that party's legal representative in a
legal action.
(c) DEHNmONS.-For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "domestic business concern" means-
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the
United States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, associatfon, joint stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has as its principal place of business the United States, or
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
(2) the term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce, transporta-
tion, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign
duct of its citizens abroad. See EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (1991) ("Both parties
concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States."). See also Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 30 (1965) ("A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a
rule of law.., attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wher-
ever the conduct occurs."). Third, domestic legislation would most likely obviate any
choice of law controversy as it is generally accepted that in a U.S. court, "[U.S.] law
prevails over inconsistent jurisdictional limits." BoPN, supra note 49, at 510. See also
United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("We are concerned only with
whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States....
[A]s a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law.").
148. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1
& 78dd-2). The Act was amended as part of an omnibus trade bill passed in 1988. See
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ments, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. i, §§ 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25
(1988).
149. The term "domestic business concern" is borrowed from the FCPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(a).
150. Like the FCPA, the proposed legislation is rooted in the Commerce Clause. It is
this grounding in the Commerce Clause that renders the statute more constitutionally
(as well as ideologically) sound than the ATCA.
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country and any State or between any State and any place or ship
outside thereof, and such term includes the intrastate use of-
(A) a telephone or any other interstate means of communication, or
(B) any other interstate instrumentality.
(3) the term "foreign affiliate" means any subsidiary or business partner
operating in a foreign country; a foreign government or government offi-
cial qualifies as such.
(4) a domestic business concern "engages principally" in a business
enterprise where it:
(A) maintains a majority equity interest in the foreign affiliate or in
the enterprise itself; or
(B) maintains a controlling minority equity interest in the foreign
affiliate or in the enterprise itself; or
(C) invests $5,000,000 in cash or capital into the enterprise.
(5) "predisposition"
(A) a foreign affiliate is "predisposed" to commit a human rights
violation where:
(1) it has in the past committed a human rights violation, as defined by
this Act, to further a business interest since January 1, 1978; and
(2) a reasonable inquiry into the affiliate's past would have uncovered
as much.
(B) establishing whether or not an affiliate has in the past commit-
ted a human rights violation-while a prior judicial ruling is the
most conclusive evidence that a violation had been committed by an
affiliate, it is not the only form of evidence. (C) predisposition
limitation waived in the context of foreign subsidiaries-in the event
that the foreign affiliate is a subsidiary of the defendant, the predis-
position limitation is inapplicable.
(6) "human rights violations" include:
(A) slavery or slave trade;
(B) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
(C) prolonged arbitrary detention; or
(D) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.
SEC. 2. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS.
(a) JURISDIcTION OvER NEW CAUSE OF AcnoN.-Chapter 85 (relating to dis-
trict court jurisdiction) of tide 28, United States Code, is amended to
include civil actions brought under this Act.
(b) DocmNE OF FORUM NoN-CoNvENIENS INAPPLICABLE TO Sturs BROUGHT
UNDER This Acr.-Civil actions commenced under this Act shall be enter-
tained in the District Courts of United States in spite of the possible exist-
ence of an adequate foreign forum or the potential force of the public and
private factors weighing in favor of a venue-based dismissal; changes of
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 151 remain permissible.
C. An Explication of the Proposed Legislation
The federal legislation proposed by this Note bears a strong resemblance to
the FCPA in terms of both substance and form. As a matter of substance,
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1948) ("For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer a civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.").
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the proposed legislation trails U.S. companies as they venture abroad to
ensure a baseline standard of moral conduct.' 5 2 As a matter a form, the
legislation sets forth a list of prohibited conduct153 and authorizes crimi-
nal as well as civil proceedings to enforce its proscriptions.15 4
Section 1 of the legislation contains its substantive provisions. Sub-
section (a) censures the vicarious commission of four offenses: (1) slavery,
(2) murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (3) prolonged arbi-
trary detention, and (4) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. This list is derived from the violations delineated in
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations at sections 404 and 702;155 it
borrows those offenses applicable in the context of project finance.
A U.S. business violates the Act where it enters into an agreement with
a foreign affiliate "predisposed" to commit any of the aforementioned
human rights violations and where one such violation occurs in further-
ance of the enterprise. An affiliate is "predisposed" where "it has commit-
ted a human rights violation, as defined by [the] Act, to further a business
interest sinceJanuary 1, 1978,"15 6 and "a reasonable inquiry into the affili-
ate's past would have uncovered as much." Where the entity committing
the human rights violation is a subsidiary of the defendant, the "predispo-
sition" limitation does not apply.' 5 7
The statute confines liability to "predisposed" non-subsidiary affiliates
to limit the scope of its application. While the initiative aims to expand
corporate accountability, it strives to do so without unduly chilling foreign
investment or placing U.S. business interests at a competitive disadvantage.
Thus, a domestic business concern does not subject itself to liability where
it deals with a non-subsidiary affiliate never before implicated in a human
rights violation to further its economic interests. Only a company that
associates itself with a foreign affiliate with a dubious track record assumes
the risk of liability.
A domestic business concern "engages principally" in an enterprise
where it maintains a majority or controlling interest in the enterprise or in
152. SeeJEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HusIsIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAcTIcES AcT:
COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 24 (1997) (explaining that Con-
gress and the Ford Administration pushed for the FCPA "to restore public confidence in
the integrity of the American business community.").
153. The FRCP contains such a list at § 78dd-2(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) ("Any domestic concern that violates [the anti-bribery
proscriptions] shall be fined not more than $2,000,000... [and] shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney
General."). One point of divergence between the two statutes is that the proposed legis-
lation's civil suit provision is available to private litigants as well as the Attorney
General.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 404, 702, supra note 97.
156. The statute restricts its scope to human rights violations committed within the
last twenty years - an interval arbitrarily chosen - to limit its application. Without
some form of temporal restriction, most, if not all government affiliates could potentially
trigger liability.
157. The statute assumes that a parent company generally has sufficient knowledge
of and/or control over the activities of its subsidiaries to know whether they are predis-
posed to commit a human rights violation.
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the foreign affiliate itself. Engagement is also established where a U.S.
business invests $5,000,000 in cash or capital in the enterprise.
As stated above, a domestic business concern that violates the statute
subjects itself to both civil and criminal liability. In regards to the potential
criminal sanctions, a conviction under the act can result in a $4,000,000
fine - twice the maximum penalty for a criminal violation of the FCPA-15 8
Considering that the proposed legislation seeks redress for the commission
of a human rights violation - an offense substantially more egregious and
blameworthy than the corruption of a foreign government official - such a
penalty is appropriate if not too lenient.
Section 2 of the proposed legislation addresses the procedural aspects
of the initiative. Subsection (a) amends tide 28 of the U.S. Code to create
the federal cause of action necessary to enable the Section 1(b)(2) civil
actions. Subsection (b) preempts the application of the forum non con-
veniens doctrine to suits commenced under the new Act.15 9
D. Arguments in Favor of the Proposed Legislation
Having set forth the proposed legislation, this Note now turns to the practi-
cal and theoretical arguments that support it.
1. The Migration of U.S. Business into Transitional Markets Necessitates
Such Legislation
There has been significant growth in U.S. business activity in economically
"transitional" nations. 160 As many of the regimes in these nations have
weak human rights traditions, there exists an increased likelihood of dol-
lar-backed inequity. The recent proliferation of vicarious human rights liti-
gation instituted by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. corporations
corroborates this conclusion. 1 61
2. The Proposed Legislation Would Benefit U.S. Business Interests
While some may argue that the proposed legislation would unduly burden
U.S. business interests, the stronger view is that the initiative would actu-
ally benefit them. In the wake of Unocal, U.S. companies investing in Third
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g).
159. The use of legislation to preempt the application of forum non-conveniens in
transnational tort actions is by no means unprecedented. In 1913, the Texas legislature
statutorily abolished the doctrine in suits brought under section 71.031 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a provision that in limited circumstances creates a
cause of action for the death or personal injury of "a citizen of [Texas], of the United
States, or of a foreign country" that occurs abroad. Tax. Civ. PRAc. & Rum. CODE ANN.
§ 1.001(a) (West Supp. 1989). See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,
679 (Tex. 1990) ("We conclude that the legislature has statutorily abolished the doctrine
of forum non conveniens in suits brought under section 71.031.").
160. See BTALoAs & HusisiA, supra note 152, at 55. Key transitional markets include:
Burma, China, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. See Develop-
ers Must Pick Local Partners Carefully, supra note 5.
161. See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Civ. No. 96-8386 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Nov. 8, 1996); Beneal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); Doe
v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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World or transitional countries face a legitimate threat of vicarious human
rights liability. As this liability stems from an evolving body of judge-made
law, its most menacing facet - from the standpoint of U.S. business - is
its sheer indeterminacy. In short, U.S. companies have no bright line rules
to follow to avoid liability. Gregory Wallace, a partner at the New York
office of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, & Handler, explains the dilemma as
follows:
[The Unocal holding] strikes a blow for human rights against an alleged vio-
lator, but it offers virtually no guidance to companies that want to avoid a
violation. All the doctrine does is warn companies very generally that they
should not knowingly benefit from a governmental business partner's viola-
tions of human rights. But, how direct must the benefit be to come under
this doctrine? What degree of knowledge is required? What kinds of
human rights abuses?162
The proposed legislation addresses Wallace's concern by providing
guidelines for U.S. corporations who seek to engage in business activities
abroad. Not only does it set forth with great specificity the conduct which
gives rise to liability, it defines such conduct in objective terms. The "pre-
disposition" inquiry, for example, is largely factual as it is rooted in the
human rights track record of the foreign affiliate. The "engagement"
inquiry is similarly objective as it is driven by three bright line rules. 163
In addition to such predictability, another beneficial aspect of the leg-
islation - from the standpoint of U.S. business - is its carefully tailored
scope. As discussed above, the initiative is not designed to chill foreign
investment. Rather, it is constructed to facilitate thoughtful foreign invest-
ment by restricting liability to those firms which voluntarily or recklessly
contract with unsavory foreign affiliates. Furthermore, because the legisla-
tion penalizes only those human rights violations committed "in further-
ance" of the business enterprise, U.S. corporations will not be held
accountable for the ancillary indiscretions of their foreign affiliates. This
stipulation enables U.S. business interests to contract with "transitional"
foreign governments without assuming an inordinate degree of risk.
3. The Proposed Legislation Fittingly Calls a Crime a "Crime"
As discussed above, the two forms of relief currently available to a foreign
plaintiff complaining of a U.S. corporation's extra-territorial violation of
fundamental human rights are: (1) a municipal tort suit, and (2) an ATCA
suit. As wholly civil measures, neither makes a normative statement about
the defendant's conduct; private litigation, unlike criminal prosecution,
"does not offer the full force of society's condemnation of human rights
abuses."164 Accordingly, an argument in favor of the proposed legislation
is that, in affording criminal as well as civil sanctions, the initiative fittingly
162. Wallace, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
163. Again, a domestic concern is "engaged principally" where it maintains a major-
ity or controlling interest in the affiliate or the enterprise or where it commits
$5,000,000 to the venture.
164. Stephens, supra note 100, at 604.
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calls a crime a "crime."'165
4. How Can We Have the FCPA and not Legislation of this Sort?
As a matter of "regulatory consistency," the existence of extra-territorial
anti-bribery legislation (the FCPA) without corresponding extra-territorial
human rights legislation is troubling. The striking results of this paradox
can be illustrated with the following hypothetical: Widgets International
(WI), a U.S. corporation, subjects itself to $2,010,000 in criminal and civil
sanctions where it bribes a foreign trade official through an overseas affili-
ate; 166 in contrast, WI is effectively immune from redress where it induces
a corrupt foreign government to enslave a small village to construct its wid-
get manufacturing plant.
5. Proposed Legislation Comports with the Emerging View of a 'World,
Society"
A strong argument can be made that the proposed legislation - or the Uno-
cal doctrine in general - comports with the emerging perspective of a
"world society" where concern for fundamental human rights transcends
national borders. 16 7 Under such a normative framework, foreign plaintiffs
would not be denied the opportunity for redress simply because of their
citizenship. Quoting William Felice in Taking Suffering Seriously: The
Importance of Collective Human Rights:
Citizenship today, in a "globalizing world," is profoundly different from citi-
zenship in previous centuries. Due to the bountifulness of information, the
enhancement of people's analytic skills, and the myriad of ways in which the
planet has become smaller to us, some assert that national patriotism has
lessened, and document how ... social movements move across borders.
Nations, in fact, appear to be an inappropriate unit to address the prolifera-
tion of global concerns for the emerging century. ... If we can develop a
new normative framework to guide the new global society, perhaps some of
the structures causing human suffering can be exposed and changed.16 8
Conclusion
Where conducted properly, U.S. project finance in transitional countries is
beneficial to all concerned. U.S. corporate investors gain access to bur-
geoning foreign markets. Foreign "investees," in turn, receive much needed
capital and equally valuable exposure to U.S. practices and ideals - expo-
sure which, in the long run, should speed the transition to democracy.
Because of the practice's tremendous "upside," an effort should be made to
curb its distressing "downside"-its occasional sponsorship of human rights
165. As laid out above, Section 1(b)(1) of the proposed legislation authorizes up to
$4,000,000 in criminal fines for a violation of its substantive provisions.
166. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2).
167. See WILLIAM F. FEUCE, TAKING SUFFERING SERIOUSLY: THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLEC-
TWE HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (1996).
168. Id. at 105-06.
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violations in transitiorial countries. While Judge Paez's preliminary order
certainly qualifies as such, one must question its limited scope, its shaky
grounding in customary international law, and its indiscernible parame-
ters. The new federal legislation proposed by this Note is precisely the sort
of initiative that is required because it fosters increased investor accounta-
bility while simultaneously affording bright line rules to enable parties to
avoid unforeseen liability.
